Ces programmes, plus ou m moins connus, se prévalent le  soutien aux  ONG, aux  parties politiques marocains, et la promotion des  droits de l’homme,  des réformes du système judiciaire et de gouvernance. Programmes qui sont bien entendu souvent contestables et contestés au Maroc comme dans d’autres pays concernés. 

Le Think-tank européen FRIDE, basé à Madrid, a mené une étude sur les effets de ces politiques européennes dites de « promotion de la démocratie et des droits humains au Maroc ».  Il a interrogé des acteurs de la vie politique et associative marocaine sur leurs effets sur le processus de démocratisation au Maroc en général. Parmi est questions posées,  le fait que ces programmes correspondent ou non aux attentes  et s’ils portent atteintes aux valeurs marocaines. Plus généralement il s’agissait pour le think-tank européen de s’interroger sur les risques de « la promotion internationale »  de la démocratie et des  choses « à faire » ou, au contraire, à « ne pas faire »  dans ce genre de programmes.

Pour ce faire FRIDE à demander leur avis  à un large panel de la vie politique et associative  marocaine  allant de Nadia Yassine à Azeddine Akesbi , de Mustafa Ramid à Ahmed Zaidi,  de Ali Lmrabet à Khalil Hachimi Idrissi,  du Forum Marocain Vérité et Justice au SNPM.

Le résultat des consultations a été publié dans un rapport publié par Fride cette semaine « Assessing Democracy Assistance : Morocco » . Le rapport rédigé par Anna Khakee est téléchargeable sur le site du Think-tank.

En voici quelques extraits, en anglais. (Les passages  en gras italiques renvoient à mes propres réponses).

-Sur l’impact de ces programmes sur la  démocratisation du Maroc en général :

Moroccan views on the impact of democracy promotion

What effect has international democracy promotion had in Morocco to date? On the macro level, there is general agreement that ‘the institutional architecture that defi nes the power in Morocco has not evolved much in the last decade’. Power is still vested with the king, and constitutional amendments, although much debated, have not materialised. In that sense, no actor – national nor international – promoting democracy in Morocco has had any infl uence on the fundamentals of the system. According to a representative of one of the main international democracy promotion agencies in the country, during the last decade in Morocco, ‘momentous moments’ have time and again been turned into mere ‘reconfi gurations’ through dilution and cooption (see also introduction to this study).

At the same time, most actors agree that the situation has evolved on the meso level, although whether the glass is half full or half empty is a question very much at the centre of political debate in the country. Hence, not surprisingly, there is no general agreement on the exact areas where change has been most signifi cant, nor as regards the sustainability of reform, although some themes are recurrent: The expansion of women’s rights is almost universally considered a major achievement, the increased freedom of the written press, the expansion of civil society, the IER, and Amazigh rights are other oft-cited areas of progress (albeit with the caveats discussed in the introductory section to this report).

Sur les « risques » de la promotion internationale à la démocratisation

Hardly surprisingly given their emphasis on traditional and Islamic values, religious parties tend to be more critical of the model of democracy supported by Western donors. According to a leading PJD figure, ‘The Europeans want Moroccans to adopt Western values; their aid refl ects this [...] Western NGOs and governments are all in the same mode of rejecting Moroccan identity’. Another PJD MP agrees: ‘With foreign financing, the goals of Moroccan NGOs can be, and often are, distorted’. Sensitive issues in this respect encompass homosexuality, freedom of religion and gender, as statements such as ‘Homosexuality will never be accepted by Moroccans’ and ‘Moroccan women’s NGOs repeat what is said elsewhere. It’s Western’testify. Clashes do not entirely paralyse cooperation, however. With a bit of ingenuity, compromises can at times be found. A leading PJD member explains: ‘the abolition of the death penalty is impossible because it goes against the Koran. However, the suspension of its application is possible. One has to fi nd solutions such as this one’.

Criticism is not confined to the religious parties, however. One Moroccan observer distinguishes between political freedoms which are ‘shared values that don’t pose any problem’ and ‘the rights of homosexuals, the equality of inheritance, the abolition of the death penalty, which are rejected by the Moroccan society and perceived as a Western import’. Others, again, find it hard to judge: ‘democracy promotion is too disparate to conclude whether they correspond to Moroccan values. They are a ‘sum of actions’ that don’t amount to a coherent whole’. Yet others see this as in certain ways a faux debate: ‘I don’t know of a single donor pursuing the issue of homosexuality. Donors will eventually have to adapt to Moroccan values, otherwise, they will not find takers.’

 
Sur les choses « à faire » ou, au contraire, à « ne pas faire » pour les acteurs internationaux :
As a donor/democracy promoter:
1.- Do not come with the idea of ‘giving lessons’ (According to one donor representative, still today ‘surprisingly many internationals do that’):  this does not go down well in almost any country in the world, and Morocco is no exception. Show sensitivity and modesty. Treat partners as equals. (According to a Moroccan observer ‘This national sensitivity and pride is, it seems to me, too often underestimated by Western NGOs that are often mislead by their regular interlocutors: journalists, the francophone elite, and human rights defenders, who make the difference between the support of foreign NGOs and intrusion.The ordinary Moroccan does not necessarily make such a distinction’.)
2.- Similarly, do not dictate what Moroccan NGOs should do, or which experts they should use. The associations should make the proposals themselves.
3.- Many national and international agencies as well as international NGOs are active in the area of democracy promotion in Morocco. Do not start activities without investigating into what is already being done and what has been done in the past (and how such projects have/have not worked).
4.- Don’t ‘throw money at an organisation’ without checking their capacity and without accompanying them in their work.
5.- Don’t lose sight of the core issues of democratic reform and get caught up in ‘technical’ and ‘apolitical’ work. Don’t behave with the political cautiousness of a diplomatic envoy.
6.- In political party related activities, don’t pick and choose among parties, as that is not well perceived in Morocco.
7.- Don’t ‘disconnect’ from Moroccan realities. Keep in mind that existing democracies differ greatly as concerns political party structure, the role of the state, federalism vs. centralism etc., and don’t think from your native perspective when working in Morocco.
 
Sur le rôle de la diplomatie européenne et s’elle est critique envers le Maroc ou non :
The new king also presents a more modern face of authoritarian rule and the ugliest excesses of power have become less frequent. As a consequence, if anything, conditionality or overt criticism is now even less likely than a decade ago. As noted by a Moroccan NGO representative ‘there is less and less [Western government criticism] in Morocco’. A blogger notes that ‘reactions by Western states are very rare, even non-existent’. NGO representatives agree: ‘We have the impression that today the internationals are more on the side of the government rather than the people. During the reign of Hassan II, it was the opposite’. Some Moroccan observers believe that the international doctrine is to ‘promote individual freedoms and human rights, but not to do too much regarding the democratisation of the country, which remains synonymous with geopolitical risk-taking’. In those few instances when offi cial diplomatic moves have been made the reactions have been mixed. The support of the American ambassador (under George W. Bush) for the detained Nadia Yassine was perhaps one factor in the postponement of her trial. However, she herself was unhappy with the connection to the US government: ‘it was a way of discrediting me vis-à-vis people and public opinion in the Arab world’, she stressed in an interview. Moreover, according to a former minister, ‘it was considered as an attack on our sovereignty’. The EU defends itself against the accusation that it leaves criticism to international NGOs only. ‘We are perhaps not in the business of supporting this or that person or party. But on issues of principle, we can be critical’, said an EU representative in Morocco.
 
Finalement seul le rôle des ONG est relativement perçu comme positif 
This does not mean that international engagement is absent. The role of international NGOs is widely perceived as positive and effective, given that Mohammed VI is keen on promoting a modern image of the country internationally. Reports by organisations such as Amnesty International, Transparency International (TI), and Human Rights Watch (HR) receive widespread publicity in Morocco and lead to offi cial reactions. 
‘International solidarity is a good thing; all reactions from NGOs are very welcome,’ stressed the head of the Moroccan national press union. Others echo his point of view: ‘When you listen to the political prisoners [during the so-called years of lead under Hassan II] they systematically render homage to international human rights organisations which were the only ones that defended them [...] Many Moroccan associations
have taken the example of their foreign counterparts, sometimes adopting the same methodology [...] this mechanism works and there are numerous examples’.44 An NGO representative elaborates on this, stressing that the impact is two-fold: ‘international reporting gives additional arguments to those forces [within Morocco] that want change; it also fi lls in analytical and diagnostic gaps that we have in Morocco’.
Sur les formations et séminaires qui ont été organisés au profit des partis politiques marocains à l’occasion des dernières législatives marocaines
Training for candidates receives a mixed press: “I used the NDI method and got zero votes” laughed one PAM candidate in Casablanca. “The theory is good, but perhaps 20 per cent is useful. The programmes are a bit pre-formatted”.  A colleague and MP from the Istiqlal party agrees: “I always say that USAID and NDI make a huge effort, but that the results are not there. Political parties are not part of elaborating the programme and themes are pre-defined. The training does not take into account the specificity of campaigning in Morocco”.  
In contrast, the political party training was viewed positively by some of those with a first-hand experience of the work: “The focus groups were very good, useful for finding out what voters actually think.”  Others regretted the lack of links between the training centres of the political parties and the donor side.
 
Among both Moroccan and international interlocutors, there were those that questioned the utility of working on elections and political parties when parliaments and local governments are so powerless in the Moroccan political system:  “At the end of the day, what are they fighting for?”  “I’m not saying that it is not a good thing to support elections, but one should ask oneself the question: what are the possible results?”  “It seems to me that these organisations should not work within the logic of the electoral timetables, but more long-term and on an essential question: how to reinforce political actors in Morocco... And in particular help the country to have a political culture, otherwise efforts will be in vain.” 
 
Pour l’intégralité du rapport, les points de vue de l’ensemble des interviewés, et les conclusions, c’est par ici .